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SyriaThe paper pursues a twofold objective. From a methodological viewpoint it shows how to carry out an
impacts evaluation of exogenous shocks on poverty and inequality in a context characterised by out-
of-equilibrium, poorly-adjusting markets, as it is the case in many developing countries, using a social
accounting matrix framework. From an empirical viewpoint it provides an assessment of how the cereal
price spikes of 2007–2008 and the global recession of 2008–2009 have impacted the welfare of Syrian
households and how did they compound with the on-going agricultural sector liberalisation imple-
mented by the Government of Syria since mid 1990s. This will contribute to shed some lights on the eco-
nomic background behind the spreading of unrest across the country over the last couple of years or so.
The results show that liberalisation impacts are very different and largely affected by the adopted bud-
get closure rules. While reforms aiming at reducing agricultural market distortions (such as production
subsidies and price support for strategic crops) could generally have a positive effect on growth, poverty
and inequality, the elimination of food security interventions (such as food stamp schemes) determines
an adverse distributional impact against rural household and an increase of poverty. The recent macro-
economic shocks (food price crisis and the global recession) determined a generalised poverty increase
and showed an income distribution bias against rural households.
Three fundamental policy implications can be drawn by this study. First, the liberalisation of agricul-
tural sector shows a significant growth potential and is likely to determine positive effects on poverty
through a generalised increase of incomes as well as public budget savings that could be used for pursu-
ing other policy goals. Second, in the short-run there is a structural trade-off between equity improve-
ments and poverty alleviation: the policy options that will more likely reduce absolute poverty show
undesirable distributive biases (both on overall inequality and on rural households vis-à-vis urban house-
holds). Third, the reform should include a careful design of the use of budget savings, mainly to address
equity goals that are likely to be generated, in the short-run, by liberalisation.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Exogenous shocks, such as the recent food price spikes or the
global recession, and policy reform, such as market liberalisation,
have differentiated impacts on households’ welfare according to
the household level of poverty and livelihood strategy. Therefore,
any study aiming at assessing those impacts must be able to
capture the transmission mechanisms of those shocks to different
income and livelihood groups. This is particularly relevant in mid-
dle-income countries that are already on their own way towards
modernisation and economic diversification.A suitable framework for this exercise is represented by the so-
cial accounting matrix (SAM), that is ‘a comprehensive, flexible and
disaggregated framework that elaborates and articulates the gen-
eration of income by activities of production and the distribution
and redistribution of income between social and institutional
groups’ (Round, 2003: 162). A first, methodological objective of
this paper is to propose an analytical framework to carry out a
SAM-based assessment of exogenous shocks and policy impacts
on poverty and inequality in a context featuring out-of-equilibrium
poorly adjusting markets, as is the case in many developing
countries.
Syria is a good example of such conditions. It is a lower-middle
income country with a quite diversified economy (agriculture
accounting for 22.9% of GDP, industry for 30.6% and services for
40.5% in 2009) (NAPC, 2007b; World Bank, 2011), a relatively un-
equal income distribution (the Gini index was 0.374 in 2004, but
the bottom 20% of population accounted for only 7.2% of Syria total
2B. Rocchi et al. / Food Policy 43 (2013) 190–203 191expenditure, while the richest 20% consumed more than 40%) and
a poverty headcount ranging between 10% and 33% of total popu-
lation (according to the extreme or standard national poverty line,
respectively), but with significant differences across regions (El
Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005).
Since mid 1990s Syria entered a process of economic reform
aiming at transforming a centrally planned economy into a so-
called ‘social market economy’, that is a market economy charac-
terised by an active role by the Government. This process has
accelerated over the last five years or so and also agriculture is
on its way to liberalisation. This process of policy reform and struc-
tural transformation has been recently impaired by the political
crisis caused by the unprecedented wave of protests spreading
out across the country since early 2011 and eventually resulted
in an open conflict between the Government of Syria and various
opposition groups. However, before the onset of protests Syria
had been hit by two major economic shocks, namely the 2007–
2008 price crisis and the 2008–2009 global recession. Thus it
would be interesting to assess how those shocks have impacted
the welfare of Syrian households and how did they compound with
the on-going policy reform process. This will contribute to shed
some lights on the economic background behind the spreading of
unrest across the country over the last two years or so.1
The paper is organised as follows. The following section puts the
study in perspective, summarising the main findings of the litera-
ture on agricultural sector liberalisation and its outcomes in terms
of poverty and inequality. Section ‘The Syrian economy: Back-
ground and recent economic developments’ provides some back-
ground information on the Syrian economy and its recent
developments. Section ‘Methodology’ describes data sources, mod-
elling approach and simulation strategy of the study. Simulation
results are discussed in section ‘Simulation results’ . Finally, section
‘Concluding remarks’ summarises the main findings of the paper.
Poverty and distributive impacts of agricultural sector
liberalisation
Development strategies and agricultural liberalisation
Development strategies implemented after World War II have
for a long time neglected the potential role of agriculture as an en-
gine of growth. According to the then dominant structuralist view,
agriculture was a low productivity sector, seen as a mere pool of
resources (both human and financial) to be extracted at low cost
for the development of non-agricultural sectors (Lewis, 1954).
Not surprisingly import-substitution industrialisation became the
dominant development strategy until early 1980s (Schiff and
Valdés, 2002; Panagariya, 2005). As a result, policies in most devel-
oping countries were harming their farmers, either directly
through taxes on agricultural exports or indirectly by way of man-
ufacturing protection or overvalued exchange rates (Krueger et al.,
1988). Furthermore, agriculture in developing countries was
harmed also by competition in world markets from high-income
countries pro-agricultural policies (Anderson, 2010).
As pointed out by Krueger et al. (1991) this bias against agricul-
ture can be summarised in a few stylised facts. Until mid 1980s the
poor countries have generally taxed, while rich countries subsi-
dised, their agriculture, although this must be qualified recalling
that almost all countries tended to protect their import-competing
sectors and to tax their exporting sectors. The major reasons for
agriculture taxation were to help the urban sector, mostly the
politically influential upper and middle income groups rather than1 However, it should be emphasised that the protests were only partially related to
economic reasons, such as the impact of global recession on the poor, but more
basically to political reasons.the urban poor, and/or industry, through the impacts on the wages
of urban workers. Moreover, the international price instability
forced developing countries into intervening with agricultural
prices in order to stabilise their domestic markets, although the
same objective could have reached with different, less costly
instruments (e.g. stockpiling).
Looking at the historical evolution of interventions in agricul-
tural markets, a common pattern emerges: countries have tended
to gradually change from taxing to subsidising agriculture increas-
ingly relative to other sectors in the course of their economic
development. Hence at any point in time farmers in poorer coun-
tries tended to face depressed terms of trade relative to product
prices in international markets, while the opposite was true for
farmers in richer countries, with the exception of rich countries
with an extreme comparative advantage in agriculture (e.g. Austra-
lia and New Zealand).
In short, during the first four decades after the World War II
agricultural markets in developing economies have been targeted
by a complex and intertwined set of policies, both sector and econ-
omy-wide, that heavily affected the efficiency and profitability of
the farming sector as well as household’s welfare. By and large,
these interventions have reduced national and global economic
welfare, inhibited economic growth, and increased inequality and
poverty because most of poorest people in the world have been
dependent directly or indirectly on farming for their livelihoods
(World Bank, 2007).
The last two or three decades have been marked by a sharp
change in favour of a ‘free market, free trade, laissez-faire’ policy
environment that led to the globalisation of world markets and
to more liberalisation-oriented policies at national level. As a re-
sult, the anti-agricultural bias has been gradually removed in most
developing countries, while agricultural protectionism and export
subsidies in developed economies has been sensibly reduced or
re-oriented towards less distorting instruments (such as decoupled
direct payments to farmers). According to Anderson et al. (2010)
the rate of assistance to farmers relative to producers of non-farm
tradables has fallen by one third in high-income countries since the
late ‘80s (from 51% to 32%), while in developing countries this rel-
ative rate of assistance has risen fromminus 41% in the early 1980s
to 1% in 2000–2004. Nevertheless, distortions in agricultural mar-
kets are still relevant: the contribution of farm and food policies to
the welfare cost of global distorting policies in developing coun-
tries alone is estimated at 83%, of which one third generated by
the policies of developing countries themselves (Valenzuela et al.,
2009). As emphasised by Anderson et al. (2010: 5) in a recent com-
prehensiveWorld Bank research ‘while it is true that recent studies
indicate that agricultural policies are responsible for the majority
of the global welfare costs of the remaining distortions to goods
markets, removing these policies could affect national poverty lev-
els either negatively or positively’.Agricultural liberalisation impacts
Despite the received economic wisdom maintains that liberali-
sation by enhancing economic efficiency is also likely to reduce
poverty, the wide differentiation of country-specific contexts as
well as well as the variable success of agricultural reform experi-
ments actually determined a mixed evidence record. For example,
Gardner (1996) analysing seven agricultural policy reform case
studies2 found that in only four countries the real commodity priceThe seven countries analysed by Gardner are five developing countries (Chile,
Mexico, Madagascar, Ghana and Indonesia), one transition economy (Hungary) and
one developed country (New Zealand). In assessing Gardner’s results, it should be
kept in mind that the case studies are all success stories, while failed or incomplete
agricultural policy reforms generally outnumber the successes.
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form period, in six out of seven countries the agricultural output
grew in the post-reform as compared to the pre-reform period, in
five out seven countries the overall real GDP per capita grew and
the multifactor productivity grew faster after the reform than before
in each country, notably in a period when there was no acceleration
of agricultural productivity growth in the world generally. However,
Gardner stressed also that agricultural policy reforms could easily be
stymied in an adverse macroeconomic environment.
Gardner’s assessment was quite simple, using only a post-re-
form vs. pre-reform comparison of a few aggregate indicators,
and did not take into account the impact of reform on poverty
and inequality. More recent studies have addressed these issues,
either ex post or ex ante (that is using simulation techniques).
The ex post empirical evidence is quite controversial. Harrison
(2007) showed that globalisation (interpreted as a process increas-
ing liberalisation of economic activities and trade) generates win-
ners and losers among the poor, with poverty being more likely
reduced whenever complementary policies are implemented.
According to McMillan et al. (2007: 228) OECD agricultural policies
‘are not correlated with the poverty rate or with income’ in devel-
oping countries. Conversely, at least in the short run, developing
countries that are net food importers and have a large share of
net food buyers among the poor, are likely to benefit of interna-
tional prices depressed by subsidised export from developed coun-
tries (Panagariya, 2005; McMillan et al., 2007). Another
controversial effect has been detected with reference to labour
mobility. Ex post evidence shows that ‘the poor in countries with
abundance of unskilled labour do not always gain from trade re-
form’ (Harrison, 2007: 3), mainly due to barriers in inter-sector fac-
tor mobility. This evidence is at odds with the results of economy-
wide ex ante simulations, showing that trade liberalisation and the
removal of support provided to farmers in developed countries
‘would raise the real earnings of unskilled labourers in developing
countries, most of whom working in agriculture’ (Anderson et al.,
2010: 37). Indeed, the poorest are often suppliers of unskilled la-
bour but are also less likely to migrate, due to severe capital con-
straints (Skeldon, 2002); furthermore they are also less likely to
take advantage of the opportunities generated by a diversification
of the rural economy (Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler, 2003).3
In more recent years most of literature assessed the potential
impacts of agricultural reform on poverty and inequality impacts
from an ex ante perspective using sophisticated economy-wide na-
tional and global models. A recent, comprehensive study at the
World Bank (Anderson et al., 2010) addressed those issues carrying
out micro-simulation exercises based on household survey data, in
conjunction with economy-wide computable general equilibrium
models. The specific research question addressed by Anderson
et al. (2010: 5)) is ‘how much scope is there to reduce poverty
and inequality in the world and in specific developing countries
by unilaterally or globally eliminating the distortions in the incen-
tives affecting the producers and consumers of tradable goods?’ In
this case also the evidence is quite controversial: despite a positive
impact on overall poverty, extreme poverty may be increased in
many countries; besides a positive effect on rural–urban inequal-
ity, a more controversial impact on inequality within rural and ur-
ban sectors emerges as well.
The main policy lessons from empirical analyses are that liber-
alisation alone is not enough and the sequence of reformsmatter in
addressing poverty through liberalisation, both in macroeconomic
policy and in agricultural sector (Schiff and Valdés, 2002; Harrison,
2007; Brooks, 2010). Moreover the distributive effects are likely to3 Despite some studies on livelihood strategies show a positive correlation among
agricultural productivity, per-capita income and off-farm income share (Ellis and
Freeman, 2004).be highly asymmetric between and within social groups, calling for
complementary social policies (Brooks, 2010).Modelling issues
Most of the models used in ex ante analysis are static and as-
sume competitive markets and full flexibility in the adaptation of
the economy to exogenous and policy-driven shocks. Those are
unrealistic hypotheses that do not take into account the structural
asymmetries and rigidities affecting developing countries’ econo-
mies. As emphasised by Taylor and von Arnim (2006: 42), ‘espe-
cially in developing countries (with historically trade deficits,
huge debt problems, and large informal economy with underem-
ployment in modern sector), fixing the current account, the gov-
ernment deficit and employment makes no sense’. This is likely
to imply a bias towards too optimistic estimates of liberalisation
effects.
A good example of these drawbacks is represented by three re-
cent computable general equilibrium studies on Syria (Lucke,
2001; Minot et al., 2007; Bibi, 2009). Despite some rigidities in
the exchange rate adaptation (taken into account by two studies,
namely Lucke, 2001 and Bibi, 2009) and in the labour market (ta-
ken into account only by Bibi, 2009) all these studies assume profit
maximising firms, utility maximising households, competitive
markets and perfect labour mobility among sectors. Finally, the
disaggregation of production sector is generally poor. Not surpris-
ingly simulations yield quite trivial results such as a generalised in-
crease in poverty after the economic downturn in the global
economy (Bibi, 2009), or positive welfare effects affecting only
the highest income decile of total population generated by the re-
moval of subsidies to wheat production (Minot et al., 2007).
The simulation strategy adopted in our study is different, being
designed to mimic as much close as possible the situation really
existing in the Syrian economy, marked by structural rigidities
and still largely controlled markets. Given the objective of the
study (that is assessing the poverty and distributive impacts of
agricultural liberalisation and exogenous shocks), a considerable
effort has been devoted to develop a highly disaggregated model,
taking into account the diversified nature of Syrian agriculture as
well as various household income levels (NAPC, 2008; cf. section
‘Data’). Moreover, a short-run, linear (keneysian) model specifica-
tion was preferred in representing the still largely planned, out-
of-equilibrium Syrian economy conditions (cf. section ‘SAMModel-
ling’). Finally, to increase simulation realism, in designing scenarios
alternative options of liberalisation in the agricultural policy were
combined with different macroeconomic constraints affecting the
Government budget (cf. section ‘Policy scenarios and simulation
approach’ ‘4.3’).The Syrian economy: Background and recent economic
developments
Over the last two years, Syria has witnessed an unprecedented
wave of protests which eventually precipitated into the current
open conflict. The economic impact of the crisis already appears
to be significant, with the tourism, financial and trade sectors af-
fected the most (World Bank, 2011). There are also indications that
foreign direct investment dried up, forcing the Syrian authorities to
take costly measures to defend the stability of the Syrian Pound
and to prevent capital flight. However, prior to the recent crisis,
which is the period of interest for this study, Syria’s economic re-
form efforts have helped to strengthen its growth performance.
Despite the global financial crisis adversely affected Syria’s
macroeconomic performance, the per capita income in 2010
peaked at 2750 US$ (5120 PPP international $, Table 1). Between
Table 1
Syria selected indicators, 2010. Source: World Bank (2012).
Land area (sq. km) (thousands) 183.6
Population, total (millions) 20.4
Population growth (annual %) 2.0
GDP (current US$) (billions) 59.1
GDP growth (annual %) 3.2
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 4.4
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)b 22.9
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) a 8.4
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 51.4
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) 56.3
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 2750
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions) 104.6
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 5120
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)b 75.6
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000) 16.0
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)b 3.0
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)b 84.2
a Year 2007.
b Year 2009.
4 The country has important relations with neighbouring countries and concluded a
set of bilateral or regional trade agreements such as the Arab Free Trade Area
Agreement. Moreover, Syria significantly increased its trade with the EU, especially
the agricultural trade that in 2008 accounted for 36% of Syrian exports and 29% of
imports (IMF, 2010). Before the recent political crisis, Syria had also decided to move
outward and to seek WTO accession.
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rate of growth (on average 4.6% per year), which however did
not exceed much the population growth rate (3.3% per year) over
the same period. Over the last decade the economy of Syria has
been growing at a healthy pace: between 2000 and 2010 the
GDP grew by 4.9% annually in constant terms while population
growth rate was 2.5% per year. By international comparisons, these
are quite satisfactory figures and suggest a continuous process of
real income growth for the average Syrian.
The national absolute poverty declined from 14.3% in 1996–
1997 to 11.4% in 2003–2004 (El Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005). Over
the same period in rural areas overall poverty declined from 22.6%
to 11.1% (despite a 2% increase in North-eastern region), while in
urban areas poverty declined from 14.8% to 9.0%. Most of the poor
(61.2%) still live in rural areas. The Syrian poverty profile also
shows significant regional disparities. Inequality in Syria remains
quite high. The unequal distribution of the growth dividend re-
sulted in an increase of percapita expenditure Gini index from
0.337 to 0.374 between 1996–1997 and 2003–2004. Only in Rural
Southern and Urban Coastal regions the economic growth resulted
in a less unequal distribution.
The dynamics of GDP per capita has been influenced over the
last decades mainly by the performances of the oil sector and agri-
culture. Agriculture has traditionally been Syria’s main industry
(Sarris, 2003). However, in the 1970s trade followed by mining
and to a lesser extent industry started to grow at higher rates than
agriculture. Nevertheless, agriculture is still an important sector of
the Syrian economy, contributing one-fifth to country’s GDP in
2010. Furthermore, agriculture plays a strategic role in generating
foreign exchange, or saving foreign exchange through import sub-
stitution, as well as for implementing domestic welfare policy as
far as food subsidies are concerned.
Syria’s growth performance has strengthened over the last dec-
ade, reflecting not only the hitherto favourable external environ-
ment for oil-producing countries, but also the country’s own
reform efforts. Indeed, the new globalisation drive, regional com-
petition for access to global markets, and internal socio-economic
challenges prompted a debate within the government to initiate
drastic economic reforms. This process started at the turn of the
century but was officially endorsed in the tenth Five Year Plan
(2006–2010) with the objective of implementing the transition to
a ‘social market economy’, which is a market oriented economy
where the government still plays a crucial role in creating a favour-
able environment for free activities and competitiveness, while
ensuring that market players behave responsibly. This change
determined greater openness and flexibility, including cuttinglending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multi-
ple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidised items (e.g.
gasoline and cement), and establishing the Damascus Stock Ex-
change. In addition the Government of Syria issued decrees to
encourage corporate ownership reform, and to allow the Central
Bank to issue Treasury bills and bonds for government debt. This
implied a greater openness to private initiatives and foreign eco-
nomic relations4 and paved the way for an easier adaptation of
the Syrian economy to the fast evolving domestic and international
context. Nevertheless, the economy remains largely controlled by
the government.
Syria’s macroeconomic performance over the last decade has
been affected by on-going external and domestic shocks, particu-
larly the impact of the global financial crisis and a prolonged
drought that has been affecting agricultural output (IMF, 2010).
While inflation reached 15.2% in 2008, reflecting Syria’s high
dependence on imports of food and fuel combined with a three
year drought and the removal of some subsidies, inflationary pres-
sures were contained through prudent macroeconomic policies
going down to 2.9% in 2009. Yet, inflation increased again to 4.4%
in 2010 as a result of commodity prices recover and fuel prices rise.
Foreign assets remain high, but their coverage of imports is declin-
ing. Although debt remains moderate, the recourse to debt to fi-
nance budget deficit increased with the progressive decline in oil
revenues. Moreover, in a move to appease popular discontent, over
the last months the Syrian Government has partially rolled back
economic reforms enacted over the last years, re-introducing some
fiscally unsustainable agricultural and energy subsidies and raising
public sector salaries. As a result the growth slowed by only 1 per-
centage point in 2009 as compared to 2008 and the Syrian econ-
omy did continue to grow at a rate of 4% in the midst of the
global crisis. However, Syrian GDP grew only 3.2% in 2010.
Over the short and medium term, Syria’s recovery will ulti-
mately depend on the outcome of the ongoing popular uprising
and the scope of political reforms. Even with a successful political
transition, in incoming years Syria will face the dual challenges of:
(i) keeping strong growth and developing non-oil sectors to cope
with still important demographic pressures and with the decline
in oil production, and (ii) maintaining fiscal sustainability while
providing social protection to a growing number of young unem-
ployed and to climate change affected areas (World Bank, 2011).
To sustain long-run growth, Syria will need to further develop
and diversify its economy away from the oil sector, improve pri-
vate sector development and exports. Economic constraints in-
clude declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget
deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy
use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion,
and water pollution.Methodology
Data
The impact assessment of agriculture policy reforms, commod-
ity price spikes and global recession has been carried out using a
social accounting matrix of Syrian economy estimated by the Na-
tional Agricultural Policy Centre of Damascus with reference to
year 2004 (NAPC, 2008). The matrix includes 123 accounts, provid-
ing a highly disaggregated representation of agriculture and food
Table 2
Poor headcount ratios and poverty elasticities. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Deciles Poor within groups
(%)
Poor on total population
(%)
Poverty
elasticities
Urban households
1st 97.28 28.56 0.25
2nd 67.12 19.87 4.34
3rd 11.36 3.52 8.19
4th 0.04 0.01 10.00
Rural households
1st 93.21 28.17 0.56
2nd 57.79 17.34 4.57
3rd 8.80 2.52 8.48
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a complete urban–rural disaggregation of accounts, a regional cri-
terion has been used in the classification of households’ accounts
according to where they live. Moreover, given the objective of
the study (that is assessing impacts on poverty and inequality),
households are also classified by deciles of per capita equivalent
expenditure. These two criteria have been applied hierarchically:
first households were ranked according to consumption expendi-
ture deciles of total population; then, they were classified as ur-
ban/rural. Therefore the resulting twenty groups represented in
the SAM do not include the same number of households, the pop-
ulation included in each group depending on the relative impor-
tance of rural–urban areas in each decile of total population.5
The analysis of the impacts of exogenous shocks on poverty was
carried out building on a household budget dataset made available
by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, which is suitable to be
used for living standard measurement studies (Grosh and Glewwe,
2000). In fact in 2004 a nationally representative sample of 29,800
households were asked to fill two questionnaires on the composi-
tion of households’ expenditure and on household characteristics
(composition by sex and age, education attainment, occupation,
sources of income, owned assets). Individual poverty lines had
been estimated for each observed household, according to the
household size and composition (affecting consumption needs)
and the region where the household lives (affecting the cost of liv-
ing) (El Laithy and Abu-Ismail, 2005).
In our study these poverty lines have been used to estimate
household member-specific poverty lines (elderly, adult male,
adult female and child) and for each region. Then, according to
their composition, all households included in the sample have been
reclassified as poor and non-poor, with the poor resulting concen-
trated in the lower four deciles andmostly in the first two (Table 2).
Finally, we estimated the household-specific poverty elasticities6
to be used for simulations: as expected poverty elasticities are larger
in higher consumption expenditure deciles.7 Details on the estimation of expenditure elasticities are provided in Appendix B.
8 These crops are considered ‘strategic’ by the Government of Syria because they
are a source of foreign currency from export (cotton) and/or intensively use
constrained natural resources such as water. The cultivated area is planned at theSAM modelling
The first step in SAM modelling is the identification of endoge-
nous and exogenous accounts. Usually, for small economies and for
policy analysis purposes, the government and the rest of the world
are considered as exogenous, that is the model does not explain the
behaviour of those accounts. The process of capital formation could
be considered as exogenous whenever the research question does
not focus on dynamic impacts, as is the case in our study. Therefore
these three accounts are considered as exogenous.5 Further details on SAM the structure are provided in Appendix A.
6 More precisely we estimated the partial elasticity of poverty to changes in the
average income (Pyatt and Round, 2006), which corresponds to Bourguignon’s (2003)
‘growth effect’ on poverty. The overall elasticity for total population is 2.19, a value
consistent with the relatively unequal distribution of income in Syria.Using micro-data from El Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005), good-
specific expenditure elasticities have been estimated for each pop-
ulation decile and then used to substitute the resulting marginal
propensities to final consumption expenditures for the average
ones directly derivable from the SAM, as originally suggested by
Pyatt and Round (1979).7
A standard SAM linear model assumes perfect elasticity of sup-
ply in all sectors, which means that output changes are fully de-
mand-driven and any increase in the exogenous demand for
commodities/activities is perfectly matched by an increase in out-
put, according to fixed price multipliers. This assumption is gener-
ally considered unrealistic for developing countries agriculture,
where the output level is largely determined by policy interven-
tions. For instance, in Syria this is the case of the so-called ‘strategic
crops’, which are cotton, tobacco and sugar beet.8 The presence of
supply side constraints in one or more sectors can be taken into ac-
count in a linear model calculating a so-called ‘mixed multiplier ma-
trix’ (Lewis and Thorbecke, 1992).
Simulations of the distributive impacts of alternative agricul-
tural policy reforms in Syria have been carried out using a fixed
price, mixed multiplier model, assuming different hypotheses
about supply constraints, (cf. section ‘Policy scenarios and simula-
tion approach’ below). First, the matrix of mixed multipliers has
been used to assess the impact on output and incomes of different
policy scenarios. Two further analyses have been carried out to
better understand the distributive impacts of simulations. The first
is a particular transformation of the multipliers matrix (cf. Roland-
Host and Sancho, 1992) to show the changes in the relative position
in income distribution of different household groups. A second
analysis was carried out to assess the potential impacts of reforms
on poverty, following the approach originally proposed by Pyatt
and Round (2006).
Policy scenarios and simulation approach
The simulations carried out with the SAM of the Syrian econ-
omy refer to two major sources of changes in the policy and eco-
nomic environment, namely the liberalisation of the agricultural
sector and the major shocks that have hit the Syrian economy over
the last years, that are the food price crisis and the global recession.
Policy reforms are simulated as a vector of exogenous shocks,
which mimics the recent evolution in Syrian policy environment,
namely:
(a) dropping production subsidies,9 which will turn out into an
increase in production costs. These direct impacts on produc-
tion sectors will also affect households’ welfare through an
economy-wide increase in commodity prices.10 This vector of
price changes was then multiplied by the (SAM-derived) matrix
of expenditure shares of households to obtain an equivalent
decrease of income in real terms, which is the exogenous shock
vector eventually used to simulate this policy change;
(b) reducing by 20% the supported price of the ‘strategic crops’
whose only buyer is the Syrian Government (cotton, tobacco
and sugar beet). Assuming intermediate costs and wages ascentral level by the Government that supplies the farmers with required inputs and
buys the whole planned production (NAPC, 2007a).
9 Subsidised activities whose accounts are included in the SAM are: soft wheat,
cotton ginning, milling, sugar industry and sugar refinery.
10 Indeed, assuming the transpose of the multiplier matrix as a Leontief model in
prices, it is possible to transform an output cost increase as an equivalent commodity
price increase (Roland-Host and Sancho, 1995; Dietzenbacher, 2002).
Table 3
Budget savings from agricultural reforms. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Elimination of subsidies to agriculture Price support reduction for strategic crops Elimination of PSA
Budget savings (Mln SP) 45,775 5912 21,600
% of output
– Subsidised activities 44.0 5.7 20.8
– Total agriculture and food 7.2 0.9 3.4
% of Gvnt current expenditure 24.3 3.1 11.5
% of Gvnt transfers to households 317.9 41.1 150.0
B. Rocchi et al. / Food Policy 43 (2013) 190–203 195fixed in the short-run, the reduction of output prices can be
mimicked by a decrease in incomes accruing to ‘other fac-
tors’ (capital, self-employed labour). Therefore, a first com-
ponent of the exogenous shock vector was defined as a
reduction of incomes distributed to households by ‘other
factors’, according to shares accruing to each household
group. At the same time, an offsetting increase in real
incomes, resulting from the deflationary impact of previ-
ously subsidised commodities, was added;11
(c) dropping the existing food stamp scheme (that is the so-
called ‘Price Stabilization Fund’, PSF).12 The direct effect of
the elimination of food consumption subsidies was distrib-
uted among households groups as a real income decrease,
according to shares in expenditures for subsidised products
resulting from households budgets in the El Laithy and Abu-
Ismail (2005) sample.
Moreover, each of the above policy options was considered along
with different ‘closure rules’, that is effects on Government budget.
By and large the selected policies would result in a substantial reduc-
tion of public expenditure. The economic relevance of the three
policy changes can be assessed looking at figures in Table 3. The
elimination of subsidies to agriculture yields the largest savings for
the Government budget: 44,775 Mln SP, equivalent to 44% of total
subsidies on agricultural output of activities and about 7% of total
agriculture and food sector output value. In two cases, namely drop-
ping agricultural subsidies and suppressing the food stamp scheme,
the saving resulting from liberalisation exceeds the size of current
Government transfers to households, while in the case of strategic
crops price reduction they would be able to provide resources for a
substantial increase of Government transfers to households
(+41.1%). Compared with the current expenditure of Government
the amount of savings ranges between 3.1% (price reduction for stra-
tegic crops) and 24.3% (agricultural subsidies elimination).
The Government can use these savings according to alternative
budget strategies, each having different distributive effects. Three
alternatives have been hypothesised, namely:
(i) a Government deficit reduction, which translates into an
increase of previously crowded-out private investments (Rose
et al., 2001). This alternative is mimicked through an exoge-
nous injection in the final demand for investment goods
(according to SAM shares) equal to the amount of Government
expenditure saving resulting from policy reform;
(ii) a Government expenditure increase equal to the amount of
money saved as a result of policy reform, modelled as an
exogenous inflows to SAM accounts according to Govern-
ment expenditure shares (both for public final consumptions
and for transfers to institutions);11 In fact a general decrease of prices is expected, through input-output linkages, as
a result of the price reduction of previously subsidised commodities. This component
was calculated following the same procedure used for scenario a).
12 The balance of PSF revenues and expenditures was estimated applying shares
derived from Lucke (2001) to the total value of PSF expenditures projected for 2007
(cf. IMF, 2007).(iii) an increase of transfers to households according to shares in
the original SAM. This budget rule is to some extent similar
to the compensative payments introduced by the Syrian
Government with the institution of the Agricultural Support
Fund (IMF, 2010).
In summary, the combination of the three policy options for
agriculture and food and the three closure rules for Government
budget yields nine policy mixes whose impacts are simulated in
section ‘Impact of liberalisation policy reforms’.
On top of these domestic policy changes, over the last five years
the macroeconomic dynamics at the global level heavily affected
output, incomes and poverty in Syria. In order to assess the impacts
of these shocks mixed scenarios have been simulated including
alternatively the effect of a 100% cereal price increase and the ef-
fect of the 2009 recession scenario on Syria. The preliminary esti-
mates included in the IMF Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV
consultation (IMF, 2010) record a 16% decrease in exports of goods
and a 4% decrease in workers’ remittances from abroad: these
changes were applied to SAM totals to estimate a vector of exoge-
nous shocks.13
Finally, it should be emphasised that all simulations were car-
ried out taking into account also a set of policy-driven constraints
on the supply side, using different matrices of mixed multipliers.
First of all, production activities for the three strategic crops were
considered as supply-constrained under scenarios (a) and (c)
where production decisions are assumed as still taken at the
Government level. Conversely, the constraint does not operate
under scenario (b) assuming that the reduction in price support
was combined with a liberalisation of production decisions for
strategic crops. A second constraint was included for the public
administration sector. Despite general services managed by Gov-
ernment are usually modelled as an activity in a SAM framework,
the figures in the relevant column/row are generally determined
by the policy maker. Indeed, in National Accounts the output va-
lue of public administration is conventionally set equal to its pro-
duction cost (cf. United Nations et al., 1993). As a result,
modelling public administration as a supply-constrained sector
can be interpreted as a policy-driven effort towards efficiency
in the sector activities. The changes induced by exogenous shocks
are computed assuming that in the short-run the public adminis-
tration could support the overall economy without changing the
nominal value of its output. According to financial stabilization
goals stated by the Syrian Government this seems to be a reason-
able assumption. The introduction of supply-side constraints is
expected to reduce the multiplier effect generated by exogenous
shocks on the economy: indeed, indirect and induced effects can-
not be transmitted to the rest of the economy through the con-
strained sectors.1413 The simulated impact of this scenario on total output is consistent with the actual
slow down of Syrian GDP (IMF, 2010).
14 A sensitivity analysis carried out to assess the effect of the removal of supply-side
constraint on public administration showed an average increase of output multiplier
of about 20%.
Table 4
Output multipliers and shares resulting by an increase in final demand of selected industries. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Industries Output multiplier Agriculture (% of total) Food industry (% of total) Other activities (% of total)
Agriculture 2.04 58.0 5.9 36.1
Food beverage and tobacco 2.97 10.4 58.1 31.5
Other manufactures 2.28 8.3 8.5 83.3
Utilities 2.48 5.7 5.3 89.0
Building and construction 2.17 5.3 4.9 89.8
Services 1.86 7.0 5.9 87.1
Public administration 2.01 8.1 6.8 85.1
Table 5
Households income multipliers resulting by an increase in final demand of selected industries. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Industries Total Syria Urban Rural
All households 1st decile 10th decile All households 1st decile 10th decile
Agriculture 0.737 0.440 0.012 0.134 0.297 0.014 0.058
Food beverage and tobacco 1.020 0.608 0.016 0.185 0.411 0.019 0.080
Other manufactures 1.014 0.605 0.016 0.184 0.409 0.019 0.079
Utilities 0.809 0.483 0.013 0.147 0.326 0.015 0.063
Building and construction 0.656 0.392 0.010 0.119 0.265 0.012 0.051
Services 0.801 0.478 0.013 0.146 0.323 0.015 0.063
Public administration 0.984 0.587 0.016 0.179 0.397 0.018 0.077
Table 6
Impacts of selected policies. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Policies Percentage impact on
Output Households income Poverty
Elimination of subsidies to agriculture
Deficit reduction 3.10 2.00 0.20
Public expenditure increase 1.11 0.78 0.08
Transfers to households increase 2.07 6.43 0.85
Price support reduction for strategic crops
Deficit reduction 0.43 0.32 0.04
Public expenditure increase 0.16 0.16 0.02
Transfers to households increase 0.30 0.90 0.12
Elimination of PSF
Deficit reduction 0.56 1.99 0.49
Public expenditure increase 0.38 2.57 0.55
Transfers to households increase 0.08 0.10 0.19
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Multiplier analysis
Simulation results strictly depend on production structure.
Therefore, output multipliers generated by exogenous shocks on
demand for production activities provide information that can
prove useful in interpreting policy simulation results (Table 4).15
Output multipliers are good indicators for the growth potential
of the Syrian economy and prove the important role played by pol-
icies aiming at increasing final demand. As expected the lower the
share of intermediate costs on output value (agriculture, services)
the smaller the output multiplier. ‘Food, beverage and tobacco’ is
the industry with the highest multiplier.16 Table 4 shows also
how the output increase is distributed across different industries.
While ‘Agriculture’ and ‘Food, beverage and tobacco’ activities are
able to generate an output increase also in other industries through
backward linkages, the opposite is not true: output growth in non-
agro-food sectors does not stimulate growth in ‘Agriculture’ and
‘Food, beverage and tobacco’ sectors.
A first assessment of the effects on distribution effects can be
carried out looking at income multipliers, that is multipliers
accounting for increases in incomes distributed to households as
a result of final demand increases (Table 5).
Manufacturing activities (both food and non food) typically
show a higher capacity to increase incomes of Syrian households
as a whole. Comparing urban vs. rural multipliers, a common pat-
tern emerges: the multiplier effect on incomes of urban house-
holds is significantly larger than that for rural households (at
least 50% larger). Furthermore, the impacts are larger on incomes
of richer households, with a ratio between the top and bottom dec-
iles that ranges from four in rural areas to ten in urban areas. How-
ever, the multiplier analysis of effects on income should be15 The final demand directed towards a given production activity is the weighted
average of the demand for each commodity produced by the activity itself net of
leakages (imports and relevant taxes).
16 However, it should be stressed that this sector includes activities like ‘Sugar
refinery’ and ‘Milling’ that are mainly publicly owned and/or heavily subsidised. As a
result, the ratio between intermediate costs and the value of output in the input-
output block of the SAM is higher than it would be without policy interventions.considered only a prima facie assessment of distributive impacts.
Indeed, the multipliers are affected by a scale effect depending
on the share of total population included in each household group.
As explained in the paragraph 4.1 household groups do not include
the same number of units. Therefore, in the following paragraphs
will be used a transformation of the multiplier matrix based on a
normalised measure of income shares accruing to each household
group.
Impact of liberalisation policy reforms
Table 6 shows the results of simulations carried out according
to the policy scenarios as defined in section ‘Policy scenarios and
simulation approach’. The impacts are presented as a percentage
change in the value of output, income and poverty.
Both the elimination of production subsidies and the reduction
of price support to strategic crops show a potential positive
effect on Syrian economy. Whatever the budget closure, the
multiplicative effect exceeds the direct negative impacts caused
on household incomes by the exogenous shocks (that is the de-
crease of incomes in real terms because of the adverse change in
prices and of the reduction in income accruing to factors). Specifi-
cally, the elimination of subsidies to production activities
Table 7
Redistributive impacts of selected policies (percentage shares). Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Quintiles Elimination of subsidies to agriculture and
food industry
Price support reduction for strategic crops Elimination of PSF
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Urban households
1st 3.16 12.26 28.97 6.06 17.22 29.37 14.04 13.55 0.47
2nd 4.47 15.60 29.79 9.25 17.69 29.89 8.66 8.21 5.20
3rd 1.46 16.01 29.87 1.60 14.26 29.55 1.76 1.12 12.41
4th 12.65 11.27 2.76 11.46 6.52 0.99 8.63 8.82 9.76
5th 69.92 44.86 3.47 63.09 51.49 6.08 68.77 69.27 69.95
Rural households
1st 14.48 9.45 0.56 23.72 18.45 2.26 23.23 23.43 23.62
2nd 19.05 12.33 1.16 21.99 17.48 1.81 25.29 25.50 25.88
3rd 27.78 25.30 15.65 22.43 11.90 11.90 18.67 19.10 25.73
4th 25.35 28.20 26.49 12.87 0.86 23.52 7.20 7.72 19.23
5th 1.31 24.72 51.00 23.38 39.83 52.38 21.45 20.55 2.39
Total absolute impact
(Mln SP)
473 660 7102 72 97 927 7198 7122 7020
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overall impacts result in a reduction of poverty (holding population
constant).17 The multiplier effect is larger for closure rules aiming at
increasing transfers to households and reducing the Government
deficit.
The impacts generated by the third policy scenario (elimination
of PSF) show mixed evidence. The positive effect of a deficit reduc-
tion on output (+0.56%) is not large enough to offset the real term
decrease of households’ income due to the elimination of food
stamps (1.99%). Even worst would be the impacts of an increase
in public expenditure (output contraction of 0.38%, income de-
crease equal to 2.57%). Only reallocating financial resources to
households through transfers minimises the adverse effects of this
policy on income distribution. The elimination of food consump-
tion subsidies generates an increase of poverty whatever the
adopted budget rule. Even in the case of the third ‘closure rule’
the resulting direct support to households’ income is not large en-
ough to generate, through the multiplier effect in the whole econ-
omy, an expenditure increase offsetting the direct cut of real
incomes: the overall impact is a 0.19% increase in the poverty
headcount ratio.18
Table 7 shows the impacts on inequality implied by alternative
policy scenarios as percentage changes comparing the after and be-
fore situation in each income decile.19 Redistribution resulting by
the implementation of each policy is modelled as a zero sum game:
the winners show a positive value while the losers show a negative
value, but the sum of the percentage changes in income shares
across population deciles is equal to zero. The magnitude of the total
redistributive effect in absolute terms (last row) obviously depends
on the different amount of financial resources allocated to the three
alternative policies (cf. section ‘Policy scenarios and simulation
pproach’). Nonetheless, the choice of the budget rules has a signifi-
cant impact on redistribution under each policy. As expected, allo-
cating financial resources to household transfers sharply increases
the total redistributive effect of the first two policy options17 Details on how to compute the changes in the poverty headcount are provided in
Appendix B.
18 In fact, the initial shocks (increase of direct transfers less real income reduction
due to the elimination of food subsidies) negatively impacted one half of households,
mainly in rural areas.
19 The adopted transformation of the multiplier matrix overcomes the scale effect
problem (as implied in standard multiplier analysis) by looking at the changes in the
relative position of each household group in the income distribution. See Appendix B
for further details.(elimination of production subsidies and reduction of strategic crops
price).
Furthermore, the redistributive profiles are different under
alternative policy scenarios. The strategic crops price reduction is
the most equitable policy determining an improvement in the rel-
ative position of poorer households and rural households. Vice ver-
sa, the first and the third policy options negatively affect the
relative position of rural households in income distribution what-
ever the adopted budget rule. Not surprisingly the worst redistrib-
utive impact is determined by the elimination of PSF. In this case,
the redistribution of financial resources as a transfers to house-
holds, positively impacts urban households (including most of low-
er urban quintiles), but negatively affects almost all rural
households20; the other two budget rules leads to adverse effects
on urban poor too. The redistributive impacts generated by the elim-
ination of PSF appear even more adverse when looking at the size of
impacts relative to the initial situation of each group (redistributive
elasticities21): the largest impacts positively affect the richer house-
hold and negatively affect the poorest ones (irrespective of where do
they live). These results clearly call for a careful targeting of transfers
to households to prevent adverse distributive effects.22
The overall poverty impact of policy reforms is small (Table 8).
The first two policy options reduce poverty whatever the closure
rule adopted for Government budget. The elimination of produc-
tion subsidies with an equivalent increase in transfers to house-
holds is the most effective alternative in terms of poverty
reduction (0.85%). Conversely the elimination of food stamps
may increase poverty up to 0.55% (in the case the public expendi-
ture increase budget rule would be adopted). The transformation of
PSF budget into transfers to households almost offsets this nega-
tive effect but with different outcomes on different household
groups. Indeed, poverty is reduced only for relatively less poor dec-
iles in the urban areas, while the rural poor are all negatively
affected.
Impact of cereal price spike and global recession
The impacts on income distribution of the three simulations
mimicking the exogenous shocks are assessed computing two indi-20 Only the highest decile gets a positive redistributive impact.
21 Details on calculation and figures on redistributive elasticities are provided in
Appendix B, Table A.5.
22 Simulations were carried out assuming that transfers were distributed among
households groups according to the SAM shares.
Table 8
Impacts on poverty of selected policies (percentage changes). Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Deciles Elimination of subsidies to agro-food sector Price support reduction for strategic crops Elimination of PSF
Deficit
reduction
Public exp.
incr.
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public exp.
incr.
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public exp.
incr.
Transfer
increase
Urban households
1st 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
2nd 0.10 0.04 0.48 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.02
3rd 0.23 0.11 1.13 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.36 0.42 0.06
4th 2.78 1.30 13.66 0.46 0.26 1.86 3.99 4.69 1.14
Rural households
1st 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
2nd 0.11 0.04 0.38 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.33 0.37 0.20
3rd 0.37 0.13 1.32 0.07 0.04 0.19 1.09 1.20 0.64
4th 2.56 0.89 8.37 0.49 0.26 1.24 6.76 7.55 4.02
Total 0.20 0.08 0.85 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.49 0.55 0.19
Table 9
Redistributive impacts of macroeconomic shocks (percentage shares). Source:
Authors’ own calculation.
Quintiles Cereals
price
Transfers from
abroad
Export
+10% 10% 10%
Urban households
1st 3.52 3.01 11.06
2nd 21.16 22.40 10.29
3rd 1.66 1.73 12.74
4th 11.38 10.70 12.76
5th 59.15 40.33 44.89
Rural households
1st 3.13 6.40 7.18
2nd 3.22 10.95 12.05
3rd 5.72 13.97 8.76
4th 12.44 22.47 12.71
5th 39.40 2.99 22.09
Total absolute impact (Mln
SP)
80 500 162
Equity bias 34.4 26.1 21.8
Equity balance 11.3 8.1 20.0
Rural bias 64.2 73.7 35.7
Rural balance 0.5 56.8 18.6
Poverty headcount 0.04 0.07 0.33
23 In Table 10 the impacts of ‘actual’ rather than ‘conventional’ shocks (as it was the
case in Table 9) are assessed. Specifically, Table 10 reports the impacts of shocks of
the same magnitude of the ones really occurred, i.e. a 100% cereal price increase, a
16% decrease in export and 4% contraction of transfers from abroad. The two latter
shocks are coupled into a single scenario called ‘2008–2009 recession’ in Table 10.
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negative impacts as percentage to total redistributive impact (last
row of Table 7); the policy scenario ‘bias’ is instead the absolute va-
lue of the sum of negative impacts (as percentage to total redistri-
bution) accruing to a given group of households. In short, the
‘balance’ indicator shows how gains and losses offset each other
across households, while the ‘bias’, focusing only on negatively af-
fected households, provides a measure of concentration of losses: a
value higher than 50% means that the negative redistributive im-
pacts are larger than positive impacts within the considered house-
hold groups (either poor households, irrespective where they live,
or rural households). These indicators are computed with reference
to two targeting groups of households: ‘equity’ indicators refer to
the first four deciles of total population, which include all poor
households (cf. Table 2); the ‘rural’ indicators refer to all rural
households.
The impacts on the Syrian households are quite differentiated.
In Table 9 the ‘redistributive profiles’ of different exogenous shocks
due to changes in the global economy are presented simulating a
‘conventional’ change of 10% in the relevant variable. From an
equity point of view all shocks imply redistribution, with negative
impacts accruing mainly to richer households, especially in the
case of the two global recession shocks (i.e. reduction in transfersand exports). A decrease in exports is the worst situation for richer
households: more than 70% of negative impacts accrues to house-
holds in higher deciles of population, although the absolute redis-
tribution implied by this shock is only one third of the other one
(162 vs. 500 Million SP). In the case of an increase of cereal price,
the balance between gains and losses in the redistributive game
is negative for poorer households as a whole (11.3%): the nega-
tive impacts on urban poor are not offset by positive effects on rur-
al poor.
Another significant asymmetric effect of these exogenous
shocks refers to the rural–urban bias. The relative position of rural
households in income distribution is clearly worsened by a price
crisis (more than 64.2% of negative effects accruing to rural house-
holds, while in terms of balance the value is only slightly negative)
as well as in the case of a 10% decrease of transfers to households
from abroad (rural bias equal to 73.7% and rural balance equal to
56.8%); vice versa, the export contraction determines a relative
improvement in the distributive position of rural households (rural
bias less than 50%, and a positive balance).
All shocks imply an increase of the poverty headcount. The lar-
ger impacts on poverty are determined directly by the increase of
cereals’ price (+0.39%, through a larger reduction in real income of
poorer households) and indirectly by a reduction of export (+0.33%,
through the resulting slow down of domestic production). Quite
surprisingly, the reduction of workers’ remittances does not affect
too much poverty.
How did the adverse changes in the global scenario of the last
years likely affect the outcomes of agricultural policy reforms con-
sidered in section ‘Impact of liberalisation policy reforms’? Table 10
contrasts the impacts of mixed scenarios for all policy options
including the effects of different exogenous shocks23 vis-à-vis those
computed in absence of these changes.
The pure (i.e. without agricultural reform) exogenous scenarios
lead to a relative inequality improvement, but characterised by a
slight increase in poverty and a significantly adverse rural bias.
The first two liberalisation reform options would be able to allevi-
ate the effects of adverse global changes on poverty and equity.
However, there is a trade-off between poverty reduction and
equity improvement: the best result in terms of poverty alleviation
is achieved by the elimination of support to production activities
coupled with an equivalent transfer to households, while the
Table 10
Impacts of alternative policy scenarios. Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Scenarios Poverty headcount (% change) Equity bias (% shares) Rural bias (%shares)
No exogenous
shock
Cereals price
spikea
2008–2009
recessionb
No exogenous
shock
Cereals price
spikea
2008–2009
recessionb
No exogenous
shock
Cereals price
spikea
2008–2009
recessionb
Pure
scenarios
– 0.39 0.58 – 34.39 10.86 – 64.19 52.08
Mixed scenarios
Elimination of subsidies to agriculture
Deficit
reduction
0.20 0.19 0.38 37.11 25.66 30.26 95.94 87.45 100.00
Public exp.
increase
0.08 0.31 0.50 21.77 13.52 24.26 100.00 99.43 100.00
Transfer
increase
0.85 0.46 0.27 1.82 1.92 1.84 94.96 100.00 94.21
Price support reduction for strategic crops
Deficit
reduction
0.04 0.36 0.55 0.00 20.46 22.17 23.38 77.63 41.14
Public exp.
increase
0.02 0.37 0.57 0.00 18.14 21.50 41.99 81.93 48.28
Transfer
increase
0.12 0.27 0.47 0.00 2.12 7.44 87.80 100.00 82.97
Elimination of PSF
Deficit
reduction
0.49 0.88 1.07 71.22 68.89 71.12 74.39 74.07 74.84
Public exp.
increase
0.55 0.94 1.13 70.70 68.38 72.41 75.76 75.36 76.23
Transfer
increase
0.19 0.57 0.76 51.35 48.73 51.18 98.16 97.89 98.20
a In this scenario a 100% increase in the cereal price is simulated: this price change is of the same order of magnitude of what actually happened in the 2007–2008 price
crisis, when cereal price roughly doubled on international markets.
b This scenario includes the combined effect of the two exogenous shocks related to global recession, i.e. a 4% reduction of transfers from abroad and 16% decrease in export,
mimicking what actually occurred to Syrian economy as a result of the 2008–2009 global recession (cf. IMF, 2010).
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policy-driven supply constraints) shows the lowest equity bias
(even null in absence of macroeconomic changes).
Looking at the rural bias, the only policy option able to offset
the effect of adverse global scenarios is the liberalisation of strate-
gic crops coupled either with a reduction of Government deficit or
with a proportional increase of public expenditure.
Finally, the elimination of the PSF leads to the worst impacts in
terms of poverty and equity, showing at the same time a very large
adverse rural bias (more than 74% irrespective of the adopted bud-
get closing rule). This result clearly shows that without a careful
targeting of transfers to households, the positive achievement in
terms of growth would be socially controversial.Concluding remarks
This study shows that liberalisation reforms aiming at reducing
the distortions generated by agricultural policy in Syria (such as
production subsidies and price support for strategic crops) could
generally have a positive effect on both growth (output and in-
comes) and poverty, while a controversial impact would be gener-
ated by the elimination of food security interventions (such as the
food stamp scheme financed by the Price Stabilization Fund),
implying a poverty increase even in presence of growth. While
the elimination of price support results in the best redistribution
profile, improving the relative position of the poor both in urban
and rural areas, the reduction of production subsidies and the elim-
ination of the food stamp scheme show an adverse distributive bias
towards rural households. Furthermore, the elimination of food
stamps is likely to generate a poverty increase no matter what
budget rule is adopted: only increasing the transfers to households
may partially offset this negative effect, but just in urban areas.The analysis also clearly shows that the outcomes of agricul-
tural liberalisation cannot be properly assessed looking at the sec-
tor policy alone. The reforms should be always assessed
considering sector policy changes within the overall framework
of fiscal and development policies. This was made running simula-
tions under three alternative closure rules featuring different use
of budget savings generated by agricultural reforms. The redistrib-
utive profiles of alternative policy scenarios are very different and
critically depend on the adopted budget closure rules. While the
simple reduction of budget deficit is likely to increase the impact
on growth though worsening equity, the use of savings for substi-
tuting direct transfers seems to be the best option to reduce regres-
sive effects on income distribution.
Relevant changes in the global macro-economic scenario af-
fected poverty as well as inequality in Syria: simulations show that
the cereal price spikes and the global recession had a relative posi-
tive equity impact, but increased poverty and had an adverse bias
against rural households. Should the liberalisation reforms be in
place at the moment of these shocks, the overall impact of food
price spikes and global recession would be less negative, while
the elimination of food security measures (that is the Price Stabil-
ization Fund) would make their impacts worse.
Three fundamental policy implications can be drawn by this
study. First, the agricultural sector liberalisation shows a signifi-
cant growth potential and is likely to determine positive effects
on poverty through a generalised increase of incomes. Second, in
the short-run there is a structural trade-off between equity
improvements and poverty alleviation: the policy options that will
more likely reduce absolute poverty show undesirable distributive
biases (both on overall inequality and on rural households vis-à-vis
urban households). Third, the elimination of measures such as
subsidies to agricultural production and price support for strategic
crops would reduce public expenditures, making available budget
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fore any reform should include a careful design of the use of these
resources, mainly to address equity goals that are likely to be gen-
erated, in the short-run, by liberalisation. These results are consis-
tent with the most recent debate on agricultural policy reform
options in developing countries.
In terms of modelling strategy, despite the linear nature of
the social account matrix model, the adopted flexible modelling
approach allowed the simulation of a variety of scenarios charac-
terised by a mix of supply side constraints and alternative inter-
ventions resulting from liberalisation budget savings. These
adaptations have increased the degree of realism of the model,
providing useful policy insights through the assessment of the
impacts on poverty and inequality. One may wonder whether a
non-linear model, such as a computable general equilibrium
model, would do better in terms of simulation results. However,
as emphasised by Rose (1995), assuming an approach as intrin-
sically superior to another is nonsense without carefully consid-
ering the specific issues to be addressed in modelling. The
generally out-of-equilibrium conditions of the Syrian economy,
where the system is still largely policy-driven and several con-
straints limit the adjustment of economic activities, would prob-
ably not be properly modelled by using the equilibrium
framework of a CGE model. The purpose of the analyses carried
out in this paper is rather to show how impacts spread across
sectors in the short-run, highlighting the distributive asymme-
tries that are likely to come along with policy reforms as well
as macroeconomic shocks.
Lastly, we acknowledge that the SAM-based policy impact
assessment could be further improved. For example, a complete
rural–urban classification of production activities accounts would
make possible a complete representation of structural asymme-
tries between the two regions and the estimation of spill over ef-
fects between rural and urban areas. Referring to modelling,
further improvements could be achieved through the adoption of
‘optimisation’ rules (that is according to some desirable distribu-
tive rules) in designing policies financed by liberalisation budget
savings. Finally, in a transition economy such as Syria, a dynamic
approach to modelling would surely do better in mimicking alter-
native paths towards a market economy.Appendix A. The Syrian economy through the social accounting
matrix
The original SAM includes a total of 123 accounts, of which 116
were considered as endogenous: 51 commodities, 41 production
activities, 2 factors of production, and 22 institutions (20 house-
holds groups, firms and an account summarising inter-households
domestic transfers). In the following tables the structure of some
relevant flows represented in the SAM are summarised, providing
the reader with the more relevant features of the Syrian economy.
Table A.1 summarises the distribution of total output among
different production activities.Table A.1
Activity shares in total output Syria, 2004 – Percentage. Source: Authors’ own
calculations.
Agriculture 18.8
Food industry 8.7
Other industries 28.1
Utilities 2.6
Building and constructions 8.4
Trade and other services 25.7
Public administration 7.7The summary figures in Table A.1 hide the SAM highly disaggre-
gated representation of agriculture (31 commodities and 28 activ-
ities) and food sector (15 commodities and 8 activities), which
makes possible detailed policy change modelling and simulations.
The distribution and composition of households’ income
sources resulting from the original SAM is reported in the
Table A.2. The distribution of income among deciles shows the ex-
pected inequality, with a the richest 10% of population accounting
for an income share more than seven times higher than that of the
poorest decile. Urban households earn about 60% of total incomes.
Overall, the lowest deciles are more depending on transfers
(accounting for 11% of total income in the case of the first decile).
Conversely the share of wages and mixed income (from self-em-
ployed labour and capital assets) increases as households become
richer. Rural households receive a slightly higher share of their in-
comes as transfers from abroad.
Finally, the percentage composition of final expenditure is sum-
marised in Table A.3. Overall, food is still the most important con-
sumption good for Syrian households, accounting for more than
38% of the total final expenditure.Appendix B. The SAM model
From the endogenous accounts of the original SAM can be de-
rived a matrix A of accounting coefficients with the following
structure:
A ¼
D G
B
E
F H
2
6664
3
7775
where
B4151 (activities  commodities) is the matrix of activities’
shares in the domestic supply of commodities.
D5141 (commodities  activities) is the matrix of intermediate
consumption shares.
E241 (factors x activities) is the matrix of distribution shares of
value added to factors.
F223 (institutions  factors) is the matrix of distribution shares
of factor incomes to institutions.
G4122 (commodities  institutions) is the matrix of final
expenditure shares.
H2222 (institutions  institutions) is the matrix of inter-institu-
tions transfers shares.
Using micro-data from a survey on households’ budgets (El Lai-
thy and Abu-Ismail, 2005), good-specific expenditure elasticities
have been estimated for each population decile and then used to
modify the sub-matrix G, replacing average (accounting) propensi-
ties with marginal ones. The elements of the modified matrix G*are
calculated as follows:
gij ¼ gijaij
where gij is the expenditure elasticity of sector j towards sector i.
Two different estimates carried out using both OLS and Tobit
estimators supplied very similar results. Table A.4 displays the re-
sults of the OLS estimation of expenditure elasticities by income
decile for 4 large group of commodities. The elasticities were as-
sumed as invariant between the urban and the rural context.
The modified matrix of expenditure coefficient C, including the
sub-matrix G* with marginal propensities, can be used to calibrate
a linear model as follows:
y ¼ ðI CÞ1x ¼ Mcx ðA:1Þ
Table A.2
Shares and composition of households’ income by income decile and rural–urban residence Syria, 2004 – Percentage. Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Share of total income Composition of income by income source
Wages Mixed income Transfers from government Other domestic transfers Transfers from abroad
Decile 1 3.5 51.9 36.7 2.7 2.7 6.0
Decile 2 5.1 53.8 38.0 2.2 1.6 4.4
Decile 3 6.0 53.9 38.0 2.1 1.6 4.4
Decile 4 6.8 54.1 38.2 2.1 1.4 4.3
Decile 5 7.8 53.8 38.0 2.1 1.7 4.4
Decile 6 8.8 53.5 37.8 1.5 1.3 5.9
Decile 7 9.9 53.6 37.9 1.4 1.2 6.0
Decile 8 11.8 54.1 38.2 1.2 1.1 5.4
Decile 9 14.6 54.3 38.3 1.4 0.8 5.2
Decile 10 25.6 55.4 39.1 1.2 0.6 3.8
Urban 59.6 54.3 38.3 1.9 1.2 4.3
Rural 40.4 54.1 38.2 1.0 1.1 5.6
Total 100.0 54.2 38.3 1.6 1.1 4.8
Table A.3
Final expenditure composition Syria, 2004 – Percentage. Source: Authors’ own
calculations.
Raw crop products 9.8
Raw livestock products 7.9
Processed food 20.3
Other industries products 16.2
Water, electricity, gas 0.8
Building and construction 0.2
Trade and other services 34.3
Public administration 10.5
Table A.4
Expenditure elasticity for groups of goods and deciles of total population Syria, 2004.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Food Beverages and
tobacco
Other
manufactured
goods
Building and
constructions, services
Decile
1
0.890 0.799 1.873 0.942
Decile
2
0.896 0.790 1.738 0.939
Decile
3
0.892 0.768 1.634 0.939
Decile
4
0.890 0.742 1.565 0.940
Decile
5
0.887 0.732 1.524 0.940
Decile
6
0.882 0.720 1.471 0.940
Decile
7
0.877 0.695 1.440 0.941
Decile
8
0.872 0.674 1.397 0.940
Decile
9
0.860 0.643 1.354 0.942
Decile
10
0.837 0.516 1.308 0.945
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1979). The system in Eq. (A.1) may be used as a basis for policy anal-
ysis simulations as follows:
dy ¼ Mcdx ðA:2Þ
where dx is a vector of changes in exogenous injections, represent-
ing different policy scenarios. However, model (A.1) assumes per-
fect elasticity of supply in all sectors. This assumption is generally
considered unrealistic for developing countries agriculture. The
presence of supply side constraints in one or more sectors can be ta-
ken into account in a linear model calculating a so-called ‘mixed
multiplier matrix’ (Lewis and Thorbecke, 1992). Suppose to identifyk (out of n) sectors that are supply-constrained. The matrix C can be
partitioned as follows:
C ¼ Cnc Q
T Cc
 
ðA:3Þ
where the C blocks with subscripts nc and c identify the marginal
expenditures propensities of non supply-constrained and supply-
constrained sectors, with dimensions [(n  k)  (n  k)] and
[k  k] respectively; T is the [k  (n  k)] matrix of expenditure pro-
pensities of factors, institutions and non supply-constrained sectors
on supply-constrained sectors; Q is the [(n  k)  k] matrix of sup-
ply-constrained sectors expenditures on factors, institutions and
non supply-constrained sectors output. The matrix of mixed multi-
pliers can be calculated as follows:
Mm ¼
ðI CncÞ 0
T I
 1 I Q
0 ðI CcÞ
 
ðA:4Þ
where I and 0 are the identity and null matrices with appropriate
dimensions. The mixed multiplier matrix can substitute matrix Mc
in Eq. (A.2).
The redistributive effects have been analysed using a particular
transformation of matrixMm proposed by Roland-Host and Sancho
(1992) to show the changes in the relative position in income dis-
tribution of different household groups. According to these
authors, the change in a normalised measure of income shares y^ in-
duced by an exogenous injection dx is given by
dy^  ½I0Y1½I Y^I0Minstdx ¼ Rdx ðA:5Þ
where Minst is the (n m) submatrix of Mm corresponding to in-
come multipliers of the n institutions considered for m different
exogenous shocks (on sectors, factors and institutions). According
to (A.5) the matrix of absolute (that is, non normalised) values of
redistributive effects is given by
R ¼ I0yR ¼ ½I y^I0Minst ðA:6Þ
Eq. (A.6) yields the value of the redistribution induced by an addi-
tional unit of exogenous inflow while total income is held constant
at its initial level. In other words, R* is a sign-preserving transforma-
tion of R where the elements of each column sum to zero, as in the
case of the original matrix, since only redistributive effects are ac-
counted for. The redistribution matrix R* shows the changes of in-
come that each group would perform if only the redistributive
effects of exogenous impacts were taken into account, excluding
output/income changes due to exogenous shocks. This means that
the impact of an exogenous shock is modelled as a redistributive
zero-sum game among different socio-economic groups (cf. Rocchi
et al., 2005; Rocchi, 2009). Dividing each element of matrix R* by
Table A.5
Redistributive impacts of selected policies (elasticities). Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Quintiles Elimination of subsidies to agriculture and food
industry
Price support reduction for strategic crops Elimination of PSF
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Deficit
reduction
Public expend.
increase
Transfer
increase
Urban households
1st 0.7 3.6 90.7 0.2 0.7 12.0 44.6 42.6 1.4
2nd 0.6 3.0 61.8 0.2 0.5 8.1 18.2 17.1 10.7
3rd 0.3 5.0 99.8 0.1 0.7 12.9 5.9 3.7 41.0
4th 3.2 3.9 10.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 32.8 33.2 36.2
5th 13.3 11.9 9.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 198.8 198.2 197.2
Rural households
1st 3.8 3.5 2.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 93.3 93.1 92.5
2nd 5.2 4.7 4.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 105.3 105.1 105.1
3rd 7.7 9.7 64.7 0.9 0.7 6.4 78.2 79.2 105.2
4th 7.4 11.5 116.6 0.6 0.1 13.5 32.1 34.1 83.6
5th 0.3 8.1 179.1 0.8 1.9 24.0 76.4 72.4 8.3
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column) yields the matrix of redistributive shares (presented in the
main text). A further transformation of matrix R can be carried out
computing the elasticities of distributive impacts, i.e. the importance
of a given impact relative to the initial position of each household
group. The elasticity of ith household group is the ratio of the per-
centage change in its income to the percentage change of exoge-
nous inflows to the household account. The elasticities for the
nine scenarios of agricultural policy reform are provided in
Table A.5.
A second analysis was carried out to assess the potential im-
pacts of reforms on poverty, following the approach proposed by
Pyatt and Round (2006). Given a measure of poverty S based on
the definition of a poverty line, we can assume that the measure
itself is additively decomposable across groups of households.
Therefore
S ¼
X
i
Si ðA:7Þ
where i is a generic household group. Defining the number of peo-
ple included in a socio-economic group, ni, and the proportion of
poor in the same group, Pi, we can write:
Si ¼ niPi ðA:8Þ
and the change in the poverty measure for each group is
dSi ¼ nidPi þ Pidni ðA:9Þ
Ignoring the effect of population growth (that is the second
term on the right hand side) the change in the proportion Pi of peo-
ple that are poor will depend on changes in the average income as
well as on changes in prices able to differentially move poverty
lines across socio-economic groups. As changes in prices cannot
be represented in a fixed-price model, the analysis will account
only for the effect on poverty due to changes in the scale of in-
comes within each household group. Pyatt and Round (2006) show
that the change in the number of poor in a generic socio-economic
group is given by
dSi
S
¼ ð1þ jijÞ dnini 
jij
yi
z0iMmIdx ðA:10Þ
where
eI is the partial elasticity of Pi to changes in the average income
within the ith group (poverty elasticity).
yi is the total income of the ith household group.
zi is a vector with the ith element equal to 1 and all the other
elements equal to 0.MmI is the sub-matrix (g  n) of income mixed multipliers for
households groups where g is the number of households groups
and n is the number of rows/columns of matrix Mm.
x is the vector of inflows from the exogenous sectors in the ori-
ginal SAM.
Eq. (A.10) implies that the number of poor in a socio-economic
group decreases only if the increase in the average income result-
ing from economic growth (that is the second term of the right
hand side) offsets the negative effect of population growth on pov-
erty. Poverty elasticities estimated in Table 2 have been used to
calculate the second term of the right hand side of Eq. (A.10), that
is the effect of exogenous changes on poverty with population held
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